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1. Introduction
The line of research I began several years ago into the
macroeconomics of the centrally planned economies (CPEs) relies
heavily on several important predecessors. Among these the work
of Franklyn Holzman (especially 1956, 1960, 1968) played a major
role.This derived not only from the conceptual framework, but
also from the open and undogmatic spirit of inquiry underlying
it. Though not an econometrician, Holzman knew that theory had
to admit confrontation with the data; though not a mathematician,
he knew that his understanding of Soviet economic institutions
hadtobe representable in theoretical terms. His ownwork
This paper was written for the conference on the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe in the World Economy held at the Kennan Institute
in Washington, D.C. on 18—19 October 1984 and will appear in a
Festschrift for Franklyn Holzman. The present version has been
significantly revised.
1quickly became part of the conventional wisdom, but more wise
than conventional, and certainly not inhibiting to younger
scholars seeking challenging problems. If he thought he had been
there before you, he would not hesitate to refer you to the
appropriate passage; but this was always good sense rather than
exaggerated sensitivity, professional rather than personal.His
arguments were vigorous and provocative but not intolerant.
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Any application to socialist CIPEs of contemporary neoclassical
A corresponding theoretical framework is
Walrasian general equilibrium macroeconomics
the need for consistent microeconomic founda i
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the sequence Hansen (1951) —Benassy(1975) —
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Serious ignorance or disregard of the relevant institutions.
3criticism requires demonstrating rigorously either the
assumptions or (with evidence) that they
conclus ions.
by testing well—defined hypotheses.
All this does not deny but rather supports the validity of alter-
native approaches. One is a variety of institutionalism, seeking
distinctive general lessons in the specificities of socialist
planning, finding those generalities in a formalism which is not
primarily directed towards proving theorems or generating
testable hypotheses. The symbols used in this formalism are
often difficult to translate into measurable variables, and the
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consumption goods and labour will
depend on events in the state productive sector. Total demand
for consumption goods will be affected indirectly by events in
the labour market and directly by the demand from state enter-
prises for some consumption goods. The latter is probably of
secondary importance (Kornai, 1980, p. 497), but the interplay
between planners, enterprises and banks which determines wage
plan (over)fulfilment is a key element of the story (Holzman,
1956, 1960; Portes, 1983). We discuss it and the supply side
further below. Whether they do jointly yield excess demand is an
empirical question. To answer it does require specifying demand
and hence the transmission of behaviour in
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How important is this effect?Wiles and Rostowski (1979) query
it on mainly a priori grounds, except insofar as they claim that
9
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Households can of course reduce their labour supply qualitatively
("effort") as well as quantitatively, or quantitatively in ways
that will not be recorded in the data. This in no way affects
the essential argument., nor theoretical modelling of it: Excess
demand for consumption goods should have a spillover effect in
reducing effective (quality—corrected) labour supply, and hence















negative. A simple calculation from equation (4) of Portes
(1981) shows, however, that the response of labour supply to
(rationed) consumption will depend on the differencebetween the
wage—elasticities of unconstrained and constrained labour supply
functions. These are likely to vary together, so the Wiles—
Rostowski claim shows nothing. Kornai recognizes that "the issue
is basically an empirical one," but then without examining
evidence asserts "that the intensity of shortage is not one of
the variables explaining labour supply either positively or
negatively (1980, p. 479)." My prejudice goes the opposite way,
along with Hansen and Gaibraith; but we should remain agnostic
until the evidence is in. Howard's (1976) results suggest a
significant effect, but I cannot accept them (nor his general
argument) for the reasons suggested in Katz (1979), Nissanke
(1979), and Portes and Winter (1980).
then,how should we measure
iumin theconsumption goods market?
sttryingto measure the difference
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believe there are interesting theoretical propositions and policy
11
Second, the formal or informal rationing schemes used under
excess demand may be "manipulable", in the sensethat a household
may influence the amount it receives, in particular by presenting
a demand exceeding what it actually wants, knowing that the
probability of success or the fraction of revealed demand which
it will achieve is less than unity. This would exaggerate
measured excess demand.Weinrich (1984) considers the
theoretically appropriate measure of excess demand in these
circumstances for the stochastic rationing case, but we have as
yet no practical procedure for making see
Burkett, 1985, who deals e
Much the most fundamental and important issue is th
problem. Tartarin (1982) goes so far as to say,
disequilibria are real, macro disequilibrium is an a
exists only in the domain of the national acco
suggests not only that our measurement problem is
insoluble —eventhe most ambitious assistant pro
decline a research grant for measuring stat istica
but also that neither monetary theory nor macroeco
are of any interest in considering disequilibria,
CPEs. Having written on both (Portes, 1980, 1983),interpretations in the aggregative economics of CPEs which
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Theexistence of forced substitution withexcess demand isnot a
majortheoretical problem. After all, atthe aggregatelevel,
bothforced saving and the response oflabour supplyto a
the goods market are examplesof forced substitu—
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We all need to use macroeconomic aggregates, even Janos Kornai
discussing CPEs (1980, Secs. 16.2—16.5, 17.6, 18.5, 21.1—21.2,
14
allquantity—rationing macro deals withtransactions
e at"false"(disequilibrium) prices.In practice,
itution is acause for worry only ifelasticities of
In seeking to measure aggregate excess demand, we cannot avoid
"netting out" shortages and slacks. This does indeed present a
problem in theory, as suggested by the Barro—Grossman definition
of repressed inflation quoted above. In a two—market model, they
require that bothbein excess demand. This stipulation that the
vector of excess demands be semipositive (so no "netting out" at
false prices is necessary) goes back at least as far as Hansen
(1951), and it is reflected in the consistent usage of the
quantity—rationing macro literature: excess demand for goods
with excess supply of labour is "classical unemployment", a quite
different regime (the converse is "underconsumption"). In
practice, however, the early period of central planning, when
most goods were in excess demand and labour in excess supply, is
better characterised as "repressed inflation on the goods market"
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methodologies in the study of Soviet househ
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plan—construction process with an explici
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and 1982). Thissubstantially above the natural rate continuously.
Moreover, just as the rate of unemployment is useful though crude
as an index of excess supply in the labour markets of capitalist
countries and is usable in cross—country comparisons despite data
comparability problems, so we can construct a similar index for
excess demand on the consumption goods markets of CPEs. We take
the demand and supply functions obtained by disequilibrium
estimation (see below), calculate "fitted" demand and supply for














while the last concerns the adjustment of buyers' behaviour to
shortage, discussed above.I therefore maintain that this
analogy is indeed instructive, and our intuition is not
misleading.
Although Kor ween Keynesian
unemployment ist economy, he
rejects any symmetry between the former in a capitalist economy
and the latter in a socialist economy (p. 478).He maintains
that suction in a socialist economy is sui generis because its
"mode of operation, its management system, and the behavior of
the agents within it have adjusted o chronic shortage which is
continuously maintained by the ins itutional relationships (p.
478)." Again, we suggest above that similar adaptation occurs in
long—run mass unemployment, and one might think that Marxists
would go even further to say that the institutional relationships
of a capitalist economy are such as to maintain unemployment
t
tconsumption (Portes and Winter. 1980 —analternative version,
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Kornai's views, however, on the roles of relative I cannot accept
prices and of price rigidity in creating and maintaining
shortages. He cites for example. groups of products for which
the relationship between price and average costgoes in the
opposite sense of the intensity of shortage as "a new empirical
argument against the view that 'shortage exists when relative
prices are too low' (1980, p. 500)." That argument ignores the
demand side and is hence a glaring non—sequitur.Equally, as
Gomulka (1985) points out, Kornaits assertion that "there isno
behavioral regularity ensuring that a rise in the price level of
consumption goods eliminates the shortage (p. 497)" simply does
not follow from the a priori arguments given (no evidence is
cited); and it is inconsistent with his view that the household
faces a "hard" budget constraint. Yet these are key elements in
his downgrading of the role of prices and because ofeconomy.I regard them as unsupported assertions.
3. Measurement
Only empirical testing can ultimately resolve the basic issues to
which this analysis is directed. Assertion and casual empiricism
will not do.To arrive (ideally) at an agreed interpretation of
the results of such tests, however, the theoretical framework
within which they are carried out must be broadly agreed as well.
The discussion above is intended to extend the area of agreement.
3.1. Econometric Results
Our own examination of the data, tests, results and conclusions
are set out in a series of papers (Portes, 1974, 1977a; with
Winter, 1977, 1978, 1980; et al.1 1983, 1984a, 1984b, 1985).
shall not attempt to summarize them, although I shall reply below
to the relatively few specific criticisms which they have
attracted.There seems to be an irresistible temptation,
however, for those who reject our methods or our conclusions to
misrepresent both by setting up straw men which can easily be
tumbled without taking the effort to address specific issues of
theory, econometrics or data. It may therefore be useful simply
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pressure in STEs because of successful
61)." Tartarin (1982):P—W "emphatically
there was] general excess supply (p. 25)."
"I shall quote one of their important
is basis excess supply was the dominant regime
the four countries.' In my opinion [emphasis
conclusion is absurd. All four countries should be
chronic—shortage economies...(p.35)" Such distortion
work, with the (widely
added], the
considered
it as "absurd", is not worthy of reply3.2. Validity of Nacroeconometrics for CPEs
How do we and others obtain well—behaved functions, significant
and plausible parameter estimates, reasonable out—of—sample
performance, etc.? Are all these results merely statistical
artifacts? If one does admit they might have some validity,
however, even some of the most cherished "stylized facts" must be
queried. Podkaminer (1982), for example, using a model totally
26
Let us now turn to substance. Kornai
macroeconometrics for CPE markets
to be chronic and widespread, f
econometric technique can work:
trade} to d [initial demand] becos
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Czechoslovakia.different from our own.. gets results which suggest aggregate
labour]...(Dlouhy, 1984)."
3.3. lation and Forced Savings
excess supply of consumption goods in Poland up to the early
1970s (revised estimates in Podkaminer 1984, still allow
equality of aggregate demand and supply in the late 1960s). The
conclusion may look rather less "absurd" if reached by various
routes with different data Sets. Klaus and Rudlovcek (1982)
summarize their results unambiguously: "We strongly believe that
global equilibrium at the consumption goods market was the
prevalent characteristic of the Czechoslovak economy in the last
quarter of the century." Others are simply not willing to accept
what Kornai regards as obvious: "...we do not find useful (and
even realistic) to accept the assumption of permanent (or
'normal')shortage on these markets [consumption goods and
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the GDR, 1.1% p.a. for Hungary, and 1.6% p.a. for Poland.
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29higher, or about the same as in their market—economy
counterparts.It should be stressed that none of these studies
pretends to test for excess demand, nor should they be so
interpreted. They and the work cited in Sec. 3.2 are simply
consistent with taking equilibrium as a working hypothesis.
Kornai (1980) asserts that the "Clower—Barro—crossman train of
thought" provides "theoretical background for the argument" that
the "time path of savings in the household sector [can indicate]
whether the consumer goods market on the macro—level is in a
state of aggregate excess demand or aggregate excess supply (pp.
477—8)." This is puzzling. He is presumably referring to our
work, yet the precise object of our analysis in Portes and Winter
(1978, 1980) is to use the quantity—rationing macro model to show
why and how in disequilibrium, this sort of argument may give
quite the wrong answer. Even more inexplicable, therefore, is
his own use of departures from trend of household savings as one
of his indicators of shortage (1982, p. 139) —anaggregate
indicator, at that!
3.4. Disequilibrturn Econometrics
Now we turn to disequilibrium econometrics (see Quandt, 1982, for
a survey).Part of the maintained hypothesis is that one
observes only the quantity transacted, and that supply and demand
are latent variables to be estimated, along with the functions
which generate them. Kornai, too, believes that it is impossible
30to separate consumption supply and demand in the observed data,
and seeks himself to measure it.
Proper hypothesis testing in this area requires a clear statement
equation, however, we have
implicitly assumes that
ur market. This was not an
outhakke r—Taylor function
h was easy to estimate, did




















































of the maintained hypothesis, the null, and the alternative. The
maintained hypothesis must explicitly admit an alternative to
excess demand —otherwise,it is logically impossible to test for
its presence. This fundamental point leads us to reject Howard's
(1976) results and to find unhelpful the model of Brada (1982),
which in this respect begs the basic question. Our own main-
tained hypothesis does allow excess demand, equilibrium (on a set
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tion to the error structure, and gave a few clear prior restric-
tions on the coefficients, violation of which would tell us that
something was seriously wrong. This standard function permitted
ready international comparisons and avoided difficult data prob-
lems. If one were to reject it on the grounds that the estimates
will be biased unless there actually was excess supply of labour,
one would have also to reject almost all consumption function
which might ever have experienced
As remarked above, our est
detail.We ourselves reco
empirical model which sho
research; to incorporate f
dispel any misconceptions,
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econometric work.
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(Portes, Quandt and Yeo, 1985). Kornai would doubtless reject
the test, because he believes that the aggregation problem
invalidates any discrete—switching, mm—condition model. As
suggested above, taken too seriously, the aggregation problem
invalidates all empirical macroeconomics. On his hypothesis,
however, we could never obtain information about the latent
consumption demand variable. But it is then inexplicable how we
(and others) continue to obtain well—identified, well—behaved
demand funct do not exist or are
unobservable.
developing methods fo
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ours as "invalid", because they are derived from
34switching macro model. We had argued previously however, on
"smoothing by aggregation" grounds, that one could expect a well—
defined correspondence of just this kind (P—W1980), sowe were
not surprised. Burkett's (1985) results are further, perhaps
definitive confirmation that our approach using aggregate excess
demand produces results which, so far from being "invalid" or
"absurd",are in fact consistent with and complementary to more
disaggregated methods.
We finish on thi
and empirical pr








The line of research surveyed here was originally motivated by
scepticism towards the conventional wisdom that the household
sector of CPEs has been subject to sustained repressed inflation
since central planning began. This conventional wisdom has since
been elaborated and defended by Kornai indeed elevated with
considerable flourish into a general characterisation of CPEs as
35
s reassuring point of agreement. The theoretical
oblems of measuring macroeconomic disequilibrium
be somewhat clearer, the areas of agreement and
ter defined. The main practical question, with
ons, is still to distinguish between the effects
gate demand and distorted relative prices (or
ike the inadequacies of the distributive network
7, Skurski, 1972, and Turcan, 1977). We may beis much which is stimulating inthis
ned currency from theworsening
ia in some CPEs (especiallyPoland)
it distorts the facts over thewhole
Os and thereby reinforces confused.
rate forecasts and unjustifiedpolicy
conventional wisdom, the underlying
ation and become immune tochallenge
buttressed by the evident political
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36I have set out the theoretical innovations in Fortes (1981.
1983). There are, however, equally significant practical lessons
to be learned from eschewing the simple certainties of the
"shortageeconomy" in favour of a more complex, more nuanced and
better balanced view of the realities of CPE macroeconomics.
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